

~ ЕКОНОМІКА ТА УПРАВЛІННЯ НАЦІОНАЛЬНИМ ГОСПОДАРСТВОМ ~

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IMPIRICAL CORRELATION ANALYSIS BETWEEN LAND USE AND VILLAGE CADRE CORRUPTION

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Abstract. *The development of the rural economy and society is inextricably linked to the development and use of land. The law gives village officials the power to handle land use affairs on behalf of all members of the village. In the process, corruption has appeared in some village officials. Because of the huge amount of money involved in corruption cases in this area, it harms the interests of villagers and the credibility of the government. The purpose of this article is to investigate whether there is a significant correlation between land use and village cadre corruption; on the other hand, it is to determine which factors have an impact on this kind of corruption, and to make suggestions for reducing this phenomenon. This article theoretically analyzes the reasons for this phenomenon based on the existing literature. The theory believes that this is because the local government uses land as the main means to increase fiscal revenue, and the developers and local public officials are formed a community of interests to some extent for their own interests.. Based on the influencing factors pointed out in the literature, the investigation and analysis of whether there is a correlation between land transfer and expropriation and the corruption of village cadres, the results show that there are no significant correlation between them in Henan. Although land-related policies and development have a fundamental impact on rural society, the development and use of land may only provide an opportunity, but it does not directly affect the corruption of village cadres. It can be observed that the factors affecting the corruption of village cadres It is multifaceted. However, there is a significant positive correlation (significantly at the 0.05 confidence level) between factors such as higher-level assessment pressure, information disclosure, and the level of cadres' integrity. From the perspective of the village, if this kind of corruption occurs, it is sometimes difficult to stop the village farmers, and can only rely on the constraints and checks and balances of the higher-level government. Therefore, to reduce the occurrence of this phenomenon, it is possible to improve the transparency of information in the process of land development decision-making and implementation, as well as higher-level governments and departments to strengthen supervision and evaluation, and guide village cadres to clean administration through the party's ideology.*

Key words: : Land uses, corruption of village, officials correlation.

ЕМПІРИЧНИЙ КОРЕЛЯЦІЙНИЙ АНАЛІЗ МІЖ ЗЕМЛЕВИКОРИСТАННЯМ ТА КОРУПЦІЄЮ СЕЛА

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Анотація. *Метою цієї статті є дослідити, чи існує суттєва кореляція між землекористуванням та корупцією сільських кадрів; з іншого боку, необхідно визначити, які фактори впливають на цей вид корупції, та внести пропозиції щодо зменшення цього явища. Розвиток сільського господарства і суспільства нерозривно пов'язаний з освоєнням і використанням землі. Закон надає сільським чиновникам повноваження вирішувати питання землекористування від імені всіх жителів села. При цьому в деяких сільських чиновників виявилася корупція. Через величезну суму коштів, пов'язаних з корупційними справами в цій сфері, це завдає шкоди інтересам селян та авторитету влади.*

У цій статті теоретично аналізуються причини цього явища через те, що місцева влада використовує землю як основний засіб збільшення фіскальних надходжень, а забудовники та місцеві державні службовці формують спільному інтересів певною мірою для власних інтересів. Виходячи з зазначених факторів впливу на дослідження та аналізу того, чи існує

зв'язок між передачею землі, експропріацією та корупцією сільських кадрів, результати показують, що в Хенані між ними немає суттєвої кореляції. Хоча політика та розвиток, пов'язана з землею, мають фундаментальний вплив на сільське суспільство, освоєння та використання землі може лише надати можливість, але не впливає безпосередньо на корупцію сільських кадрів. Можна помітити, що фактори, що впливають на корумпованість сільських кадрів, багатогранні. Однак існує значна позитивна кореляція (значно на рівні довіри 0,05) між такими факторами, як тиск оцінювання вищого рівня, розкриття інформації та рівень доброчесності кадрів. З точки зору села, якщо такий вид корупції має місце, іноді важко зупинити сільських фермерів, і можна покладатися лише на обмеження та стримування та противаг вищого рівня влади. Тому, щоб зменшити поширеність цього явища, можна підвищити прозорість інформації в процесі прийняття та реалізації рішень щодо землеустрою, а також уряди та відомства вищого рівня посилюють нагляд та оцінку, а також направляти сільські кадри, очистити адміністрацію через партійну ідеологію.

Ключові слова: корупція, сільські території, землекористування, співвідношення.

JEL Classification: D102, Q150.

Formulation of the problem. Land and population are the basic factors affecting the evolution of rural society [1](Chen Ming,2019), and the use of land also has a certain degree of influence on the corruption of village cadres. The growth machine model proposed by American scholar Harvey Molotch (1976) noted that land is the dominant factor affecting local politics and economy. The growth machine model has a powerful shaping power for the governance environment of the community. According to the statistics of the anti-corruption department of the national procuratorial organs, fund management and use and land, land acquisition and demolition are the main areas of corruption for village cadres, and the number of cases accounted for 65% of the total [2](Ding Zhonghua, Yin Weijun,2013). Take the data released by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection as an example: Among the 9 cases of party member violations that were publicly exposed in June 2017, 5 involved rural land violations, and the offenders were all village cadres. Although their positions were not high, the amount involved was as high as tens of millions; in August 2018, six corruption cases were announced involving land funding issues[3](Chen Peng,2018). In 2019, the network exposed a case of criminal involvement and corruption in a village cadre in a village in Zhengzhou. The village cadre divided and leased 1,200 acres of Yellow River beach land and more than 1,200 acres of collective land through illegal transfer of land use rights[4]. Illegal profits from signing false contracts. From an objective point of view, the current grassroots governments in the central and western regions are still "the developmental state." In the process of China's rapid urbanization and agricultural modernization, they need to rely on land to solve regional economic development problems. Provincial governments prefer to adopt fuzzy strategy, which led to a widespread phenomenon of illegal use of land[5](Fu Wei,2020). and behind the widespread illegal incidents, there is the possibility of exchange of interests and corruption.

Analysis of recent research and publications. Land transfer is another extension and expansion of state power in the countryside. The market is rooted in the countryside through policy tools and interacts with the countryside's response (cooperation, exclusion) to the country and market entry[6](Huang Zengfu,2018). village cadres are the executors of policies and specific affairs, and they have the right to transfer rural collective resources for non-agricultural purpose, so the position of village cadres has potential rental income[7](Fu Mingwei, Ye Jingyi,2017). Xu Tongzhu(2020) believed that the village cadres determined the sale or transfer of land resources, and the general public could not take part in the specific transaction decision-making. Therefore, only a few village cadres knew about the exact data of land sale and transfer funds, and the village cadres had the opportunity to embezzlement of land transaction funds[8]. He Xuefeng(2014) directly pointed out that in the process of urbanization, "70% of corrupt village officials are linked to land use, which has become the focus of grassroots 'micro-corruption'" [9]. In Yinzi's(2018) view, what is even more worrying is that the collusion between officials and businessmen has formed elite alliances in some areas. They exhibit oligarchic characteristics in terms of the authority structure, resource allocation, and profit grabbing [10], which is consuming the input of national resources and destroying the countryside sustainable development.

Highlighting unresolved parts of a common problem. Domestic scholars mostly study the corruption of village cadres from the perspective of administration and law, and take land corruption as a part of it. Few people analyze the investigation and analysis of the correlation between land use and village cadre corruption. This article analyzes the corruption of village officials with land as the center.

The purpose of this article is to offer suggestions for reducing land corruption, correcting people's negative views on village cadres caused by media, and also providing references for promoting rural sustainable development and social stability.

Main results and discussion. The conditions for village cadres' corruption: Firstly, Village cadres have the powers granted by the law: "Village Committee Organization Law", "Property Law", "Land Contract Management Law", and "Land Management Law" give village cadres part of the authority to manage collective land. Village cadres are the decision makers and executors in the village committee, and these powers give them a dominant position in land use transactions. Secondly, national laws allow land acquisition for commercial purposes and land transfer. District governments use land to develop the economy, and economic development has promoted the government's demand for land.

Zheng Minghuai (2015) believes that an unreasonable system is the soil for the corruption of village cadres[11], and the lack of supervision and restriction mechanisms is an important factor in the generation of corruption of village cadres. Although they have power, they are not officials in the true sense, so the legal constraints on public officials of the country cannot directly restrict them. In addition, the disintegration of the rustic acquaintance society and the reduction of villagers' dependence on land for survival have led to population outflows, and it is difficult for the supervision of public opinion and moral restraint in the village to play a role. Affected by historical centralized rule, villagers often obey authority, lack awareness of participation or are unwilling to participate in the decision-making of village affairs. On the other hand, there are insufficient channels for democratic participation. In some underdeveloped areas, there is only form of supervision measures on information disclosure and democratic decision-making, but there is no substance[12](Chen Peng, 2018).

Regardless of the fact that the objective conditions are available, does the village cadre have any motives to commit corruption? Liu Ziping (2017) pointed out that the village cadres have no civil service establishment and low wages. Some village cadres have weak legal and moral awareness. Under the rational guidance of the market economy "economic man", their mentality has changed when facing the "pay-benefit" interest imbalance, which breeds a depraved mentality of "compensation"[13]. The original intention of the capital inflow is the excess profits that may be captured by the scale of land management. The eagerness to obtain income prevents capital from spending too much energy and time on the circulation. A fast and low-cost method is needed for investors to get land. It takes too long and high cost to resolve "Die-hard Household" through legal means, and if it is not handled properly, it will cause antagonisms between the government and the people; however, if the project cannot be advanced on time, the state will recover the funds to support the operation of the project, which will affect the performance of local government officials Assessment and local economic development. Village cadres have to deal with many thorny issues in land transfer and expropriation. Work pressure is high, but there are few corresponding remuneration. At this time, compensation psychology will work.

Correlation analysis method. This article conducted a questionnaire survey on 210 villages in Henan Province. 210 questionnaires were sent out and 210 points were returned. The subjects of the survey are villagers and village officials; the content of the survey includes: land transfer ratio (LTR), land acquisition (LA), economic level (GDP), election (E), information disclosure score (IDS), assessment of pressure score (APS) and cleanness score (CS). Through statistical analysis of the correlation between these factors and the integrity score, we can judge the true situation of the current rural society.

Table 1

Descriptive statistics correlation analysis method

	N	Min	Max	Mean	SD
GDP(million CNY)	210	1	860	54.29	126.16
Assessment pressure(1to5)	210	1.0	5.0	3.429	.8456
Election(YES=1 NO=0)	210	.0	1.0	.471	.5004
Information disclosure(1to5)	210	1.0	5.0	3.438	.9272
Land transfer ratio(0 to1)	210	.0	1.0	.263	.3801
Land acquisition(YES=1 NO=0)	210	.0	1.0	.281	.4505
Cleanness score(1to5)	210	1.0	5.0	3.638	.8429
Effective N (listwise)	210				

This article uses SPSS19.0 software to analyze the data. From the perspective of descriptive statistics (Table 1), village GDP in 2018 was 860 million CNY at the highest, 1 million at the smallest, and 54 million at the average. This shows that the economic development status of rural areas in Henan is quite different. The average score of assessment pressure is 3.43, which shows that village officials generally feel the pressure of assessment. The average value of the election is

0.47, which shows that villagers' participation is relatively low. The grassroots political democracy is not well implemented, and the villagers' supervision of village affairs is insufficient. The average value of information transparency is 3.44, indicating that the village affairs information is relatively transparent, which helps prevent corruption. The low average value of land transfer and expropriation indicates that this phenomenon is not very common, or that only villages in economically developed regions are more likely to have these phenomena. The average score of the village cadres' integrity is 3.63, which is a psychological feeling of the villagers. Despite the fact that this does not absolutely mean that the village cadres are generally relatively clean, the image of the village cadres is still relatively positive in the eyes of most villagers. Therefore, media reports on the corruption of village cadres have created an illusion in society, making people think that this phenomenon is common in rural areas. Despite the fact that the media is playing the role of public opinion supervision, these negative exposures are not conducive to the work of the group of village cadres.

Table 2

Correlation analysis

		GDP	APS	E	IDS	LTR	LA	CS
GDP	Pearson related	1	-.163*	0.02	-0.052	-.159*	0.12	-0.106
	Significance (two-tailed)		0.018	0.775	0.452	0.021	0.083	0.127
APS	Pearson related		1	-0.05	-0.009	-0.008	0.097	.165*
	Significance (two-tailed)			0.47	0.9	0.905	0.162	0.017
E	Pearson related			1	.223**	-0.001	0.089	0.009
	Significance (two-tailed)				0.001	0.993	0.2	0.892
IDS	Pearson related				1	-0.085	-0.101	.143*
	Significance (two-tailed)					0.218	0.143	0.039
LTR	Pearson related					1	-.137*	0.109
	Significance (two-tailed)						0.047	0.116
LA	Pearson related						1	-0.096
	Significance (two-tailed)							0.164
CS	Pearson related							1
	Significance (two-tailed)							
	N=210							

*. The correlation is meaningful at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).

**. The correlation is meaningful at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).

Through correlation analysis (Table 2), it is found that there is no meaningful correlation between the level of economic development (GDP) and cleanness score. However, the sign of the correlation coefficient is negative, which to a certain extent reflects the existence of a certain degree of corruption in rural economic development. At present, China is severely cracking down on corruption and the evil forces in the countryside, which may affect the economic development of some areas in the short term, but in the long run, this will benefit the sustainable development of the countryside and social stability. The election of villagers is almost irrelevant to the cleanliness of the village cadres, which reflect that the political arrangements to restrict the behavior of village cadres through elections have little effect. The reasons for this phenomenon: On the one hand, the generation of village cadres does not rely entirely on village elections, but is referred to the appointment and restriction of the township government. Secondly, because there are many migrant workers in the village, they cannot effectively participate in the general election of village cadres when they are outside all the year round.

There is no meaningful correlation between village cadre corruption and land transfer and land acquisition. Despite the fact that online media often publish information that damages the interests of farmers due to land use, this survey shows that this phenomenon is not widespread in Henan. Another possibility is that the transfer of rural land is mostly a wasteland in the countryside, and this type of land is collective property. Enterprises uses the wasteland development to obtain government funding subsidies, which does not directly harm the interests of farmers. Even if the

villagers circulate part of the land, they only temporarily circulate the land management rights, but the land contracting rights still belong to the villagers, which will not damage the fundamental interests of the farmers. This job is relatively easy to deal with. However, there is a negative correlation between land requisition and the corruption of village cadres. The reason may be that on the one hand, land requisition will involve huge amounts of funds, and on the other hand, villagers face the loss of contracting rights and management rights (ie permanent loss of land) Situation, so the difficulty of land acquisition is huge, which shows that the compensation psychology of village cadres exists.

There is an important positive correlation between higher evaluation pressure and information transparency and village cadre corruption. The higher-level assessment will directly affect the posts, salaries and bonuses of the village cadres, and affect the interests of the village cadres themselves, so it will for certain restrictions on the village cadres. This appears to be somewhat contradictory to the higher-level government's goal of demanding grassroots economic development, but this seemingly contradictory phenomenon reflects that village cadres face higher professional risks. Under the awareness of task pressure and transfer risks, it is not difficult to understand that some local village officials acquiesced to the underworld forces to intervene in matters such as rural land acquisition and land transfer. Information transparency can reduce the corruption of village officials to a certain extent. Regardless of the fact that the village officials have the power to disclose information, due to the existence of the village affairs information disclosure system, a lot of conventional information is published. I believe that higher-level information disclosure measures and systems can have a more active restraining effect on village cadres' corruption.

Conclusions. Through investigation and analysis, there is no meaningful correlation between land use and village cadre corruption. On the whole, the people's evaluation of village cadres tends to be categorical. Some village cadres' corruption is due to their own factors and institutional reasons. However, frequently exposed corruption issues related to land use reflect the media's attitude towards this issue. The function of public opinion supervision also reflects the huge monetary benefits in land use. Obviously, ordinary people cannot solve the problem of village cadre corruption in the village. Measures such as curbing corruption, cracking down on the underworld and proposing building a rural governance system at the national level can effectively solve these problems. From a historical perspective, with the improvement of the system and the realization of the goals of urbanization and agricultural modernization, corruption related to land use will disappear. The shortcomings of this article: This article assumes that every respondent has the same perception of assessment pressure, village cadre corruption, information transparency, etc. There are not any differences between individuals and regions. This is not really the same as the reality. Therefore, there is room for improvement in this assumption.

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